A retrospective review of all emergency department notes was conducted in the nearest five hospitals to the scene of the explosion. This included one paediatric and four adult hospitals. Information was obtained for casualties attending the emergency departments on the day of the incident. Casualties presenting to hospitals on subsequent days were not included in the analysis. Casualties were included in the profile if their presenting complaint had been caused by, or precipitated by, the bombing. Injuries were classified according to the abbreviated injury score, 1990 edition,' by the authors. Casualties presenting to the accident and emergency (A&E) departments on the day of the incident with conditions not directly caused by the bomb were excluded from the profile.
On the 15th ofJune 1996 a bomb detonated in the centre of Manchester. It was the largest bomb ever detonated on the British mainland by the IRA. Although the immediate area had been cleared there were still several thousand people present in the city centre at the time of detonation. The bomb caused damage over a wide area, with over 200 people being injured up to half a mile from the site of the explosion.
Major incidents, although relatively rare events, present special problems for the emergency services. Their infrequent nature makes planning and the motivation for planning difficult to achieve. Although it is necessary to adopt an all-hazards approach to emergency planning, a lot can be learnt from an examination of past incidents. An appreciation of the demographics of casualties and their injuries from major incidents may be of value for assessing equipment, staffing, and organisational procedures when casualty profile from the Manchester bombing on 15 June 1996 for use by all emergency planners.
Methods
A retrospective review of all emergency department notes was conducted in the nearest five hospitals to the scene of the explosion. This included one paediatric and four adult hospitals. Information was obtained for casualties attending the emergency departments on the day of the incident. Casualties presenting to hospitals on subsequent days were not included in the analysis. Casualties were included in the profile if their presenting complaint had been caused by, or precipitated by, the bombing. Injuries were classified according to the abbreviated injury score, 1990 edition,' by the authors. Casualties presenting to the accident and emergency (A&E) departments on the day of the incident with conditions not directly caused by the bomb were excluded from the profile.
The best possible description of injury was obtained from the casualty cards, although this was often quiet brief.
Results
A comprehensive list of the casualties is presented in the appendix. The two most serious injuries for each casualty have been recorded, together with the corresponding AIS90 code.' A breakdown of the mechanism of injury is given in table 1, and table 2 shows the disposal of the casualties. The figure shows the age range of casualties on which data were available. The vast majority (89.4%) of casualties returned home from the A&E department, though 10 were admitted for observation and nine were admitted for subsequent operation (table 2) . The receiving hospitals progressed little beyond the reception phase of their major incident plans, and there was no significant effect upon routine work in the receiving hospitals beyond the day of the incident itself.
Several papers have recorded brief descriptions of the severities of injury sustained in terrorist bombings, although many of these are now quite old.2'-" However, there is generally insufficient detail available on either the nature of the injuries sustained or the demographics of the casualties involved to aid planning.
It has previously been suggested that a database should be constructed for the description of each major incident to facilitate planning. '5 We propose that the casualty profile for all major incidents be offered for publication in this journal soon after it occurs. Submission of a simple profile, as we have described, would take little effort by receiving hospitals. The exact structure of the profile may change with different types of incident (for example, burns) but the basic structure should remain the same.
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